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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
were interposed, provided the original pleading gives notice of the
transactions or occurrences to be proved pursuant to the amended
pleading. The crucial issue is notice, since the purpose of the statute is
to prevent surprise. If the complaint in the declaratory judgment action
gives notice of the accident and pertinent facts relating thereto, it can
be argued that sufficient notice is given to sustain any cause of action
arising out of the accident. Consequently, the Raggins court could have
found that the statute of limitations was satisfied when the original
complaint was issued, and that the amended pleading relating to per-
sonal injuries was proper, even though a negligence action was never
commenced. It would be ingenuous to argue that in a case such as
Raggins the policyholder and the insurance company would be sur-
prised, and thereby prejudiced, by a subsequent pleading of personal
injuries, since the complaint in the initial action, even though for a
declaratory judgment, gives sufficient notice of a probable suit for
negligence.
Raggins follows precedent insofar as it upholds the distinction be-
tween a negligence action and a declaratory judgment action. Under
CPLR 203(e), however, the court could have allowed amendment of
the complaint to include a cause of action in negligence, without preju-
dice to the defendant.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(1): Placement of children with an adoption agency
deemed "transaction of business."
In re Guardianship of Ellick25 is a recent family court decision
which applied CPLR 302 to an adoption proceeding. The petitioner
adoption agency sought guardianship and custody26 of three brothers
who had been abandoned by the respondent, their mother, a non-
domiciliary of New York who had been personally served pursuant to
CPLR 313.
Rejecting her jurisdictional objections, the court found that the
respondent's placement of her children under the care and support of
the New York agency constituted a "transaction" which subjected her
to personal jurisdiction in the proceeding. CPLR 302 was cited to sup*
port this holding, and it is obvious that the "transacting business" sub-
25 69 Misc. 2d 175, 328 N.Y.S2d 587 (Fan. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
26 The action was brought pursuant to Section 884(5) of the New York Social Services
Law, which deals with the power of the family court judge in matters of guardianship and
custody of abandoned children.
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section, CPLR 302(a)(1), was being applied. The court also held that
jurisdiction was obtainable under CPLR 301, which incorporated ex-
isting bases of jurisdiction, since it was settled that the courts of this
state may act as parens patriae to determine the custody of children
within its borders regardless of the domicile of the parents. 27
The "transacting business" provision of 302(a)(1) has generally
been utilized in the area of commercial activity, but some decisions in-
volving separation agreements have indicated that there is no such
limitation,28 and another recent family court opinion has flatly stated
that the long-arm statute is available to litigants in that tribunal.29
The Ellick opinion did not explicitly state that the long-arm pro-
vision applies to non-commercial transactions. Indeed, some of its lan-
guage indicates that the respondent's conduct was considered to have
had commercial ramifications: "[H]er children have continuously re-
ceived support and care in New York, and she has been relieved of the
obligation of their support."30 The court was satisfied to state that the
"minimum contacts" test 1 established by the United States Supreme
Court for exercising personal jurisdiction had been satisfied.
This decision is a laudable exercise of long-arm jurisdiction.
CPLR 302(a)(2): Expansion of tortious act jurisdiction.
In Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Chelednik,8 2 the Appellate Term,
First Department, exercised jurisdiction over a New Jersey resident
who traded on the New York Stock Exchange through the New York
plaintiff-stock brokerage firm. The plaintiff alleged that although the
defendant knew that certain securities were erroneously placed in his
account, he instructed it to sell these securities and remit the proceeds
to him. After the mistake was discovered and the defendant refused to
27 See Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925). The other cases cited by the
court to buttress its argument involved custody jurisdiction incidental to marital actions.
Evidently, the adoption proceeding was deemed a kind of custody proceeding, thus making
the traditional parens patriae view applicable.
28 See Kochenthal v. Kochenthal, 28 App. Div. 2d 117, 282 N.Y.S.2d 36 (2d Dep't 1967),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 128, 132 (1967); Raschitore v.
Fountain, 52 Misc. 2d 402, 275 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1966) (dictum).
Contra, Whitaker v. Whitaker, 56 Misc. 2d 265, 289 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County
1968), aff'd mem., 32 App. Div. 2d 595, 299 N.Y.S.2d 482 (3rd Dep't 1969); Willis v. Willis,
42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).
Dean McLaughlin states that separation agreements have been accepted as trans-
actions of business because of the "commercial earmarks" generally incorporated into them.
7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, commentary at 83 (1972).
29 See Lawrenz v. Lawrenz, 65 Misc. 2d 627, 318 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Fam. Ct. Westchester
County 1971).
30 69 Misc. 2d at 177, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
31 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3269 Misc. 2d 362, 330 N.Y.S.2d 149 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1971) (per curiam).
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